Wilderness Therapy An Alternative Therapy - 1442 Words

Wilderness Therapy The wilderness is a place known for peacefulness and can have physical and psychological benefits (Hassell, Moore Macbeth, 2015). Wilderness therapy is an alternative therapy, influenced by Outward Bound, which is an outdoor education company with programs for youth and adults. (Hoag, Massey, Roberts, Logan, 2013). Wilderness therapy combines group work, reflection, challenges and trust building exercises, varied length, and clinical assessment (Russell, 2001). Wilderness therapy should be therapeutic based, and by integrating a balance between a nurturing safe environment with an environment where the participants try new things and challenge themselves (Russell, 2001). The best way for wilderness therapy to be effective is using nature as a healer and a challenger, using eclectic therapy such as cognitive behavioral and experiential, alone time to reflect and challenges to complete solo, learning communication skills, and having steps to complete or rites of pa ssage (Russell, Hendee, Phillips-Miller (2000). These different aspects of wilderness therapy will help to aid patients’ in following three phases (Russell et al., 2000). The first phase is the cleansing phase and involves promoting a healthy diet and exercise, removing any toxins such as drugs and alcohol from a patients life and system, and ridding the patients life of outside stimuli such as technology and music. The patient should also be taught basic wilderness survival skills duringShow MoreRelatedThe Alternative Treatment Of Wilderness Therapy861 Words   |  4 Pagesbe overwhelming. There are many different treatment and therapy options. There are options such as inpatient and outpatient homes. Outpatient therapy treatment may not be enough for those who are heavily addicted and some inpatient programs can last anywhere from up to six to twelve months. Wilderness therapy proves to be a positive alternative treatment in rehabilitating adolescents. Wilderness Therap y is a more successful means of therapy for adolescence who are struggling with addiction becauseRead MoreEssay on Wilderness Therapy and Conventional Therapy1696 Words   |  7 Pagesmore difficult to treat with conventional therapy, there is a greater need for more modern and creative therapy. Even more so, individuals are seeking treatment at a younger age and need more interventions to fit their needs. Wilderness therapy is a newer intervention found to be effective with youth and adolescents. This paper will examine the major components of wilderness therapy, the mental health disorders treated, the setting in which wilderness therapy is used, the appropriate client populationsRead MoreThe Success Rate Of An Alcohol Treatment Center918 Words   |  4 Pagescognitive-behavior therapy will help you find healthier coping methods. Aftercare – attending regular meetings to keep your counselors assessed of your progress. Aftercare can also include sober living tips (such as how to turn down drinks at a holiday party), job placement help, and more. Alternative treatment options – designed for people who have struggled with the 12-Step program or whom simply want a different option. These treatments include dialectical behavior therapy, massage therapy, wilderness treatmentsRead MoreJuvenile Sex Offenders Essay example2573 Words   |  11 Pagestreatments used to manage juvenile sex offenders is also a growing concern. To understand and determine the proposed treatment methods, several related issues will need to be reviewed such as traditional sex offender therapy methods like cognitive therapy and alternative therapies like wilderness camps. Once, the juvenile sex offender becomes part of the justice system the cost of rehabilitated or incarcerating the juvenile also must be discussed. The disposition for juvenile sex offenders should be personalizedRead MoreCrisis Intervention Essay1506 Words   |  7 Pagesis determined by the individuals view of the event and response to it. If the individual sees the event as sig nificant and threatening, has exhausted all his/her usual coping strategies without effect, and is unaware or unable to pursue other alternatives, then the precipitating event may push the individual toward psychological disequilibrium, a state of crisis (Smead, 1988). Psychological disequilibrium may be characterized by feelings of anxiety, helplessness, fear, inadequacy, confusion, agitationRead MoreThe Juvenile System And Juvenile Corrections System1740 Words   |  7 Pagesprovide some type of treatment for the youth involved and their goal is to get them back in their communities as positive contributors. Wilderness Programs Wilderness programs are a unique aspect of the juvenile corrections system. The youth in these programs are taken out of their communities unlike the day treatment or group home setting. In the wilderness program, they are distracted by being far away from trouble and are kept busy by being placed in challenging situations. For example theyRead MoreTreatment Programs For Drug Treatment Program1302 Words   |  6 Pagestype of treatment program. Other treatment programs include educational, vocational, and recreational programs, group programs, individual treatment programs such as individual counseling, psychotherapy, reality therapy, and behavior modification, juvenile correctional programs, and wilderness programs. Treatment programs can also include residential treatment centers, training schools, youth authority, and aftercare. Each one of these programs provides a different type of treatment. They help differentRead MoreOf All The Violent Crimes In America, Sexual Assault Has1 116 Words   |  5 PagesFor example, you have what is called the cognitive therapy which is an effective and go to method of treatment. The purpose for this program is for these delinquents to take responsibility for their harmful actions and block out the thinking errors in which these young teens use as an excuse to justify their abuse towards another child (Dopp, 2015). Another type of treatment is the multisystemic therapy (MST). Basically, this is another alternative treatment program that is designed to make positiveRead More Ecopsychology Essay3891 Words   |  16 Pagesrecycle, which proved to be quite ineffective. Ecopsychology, in contrast, attempts to create positive and affirming motivations, derived from a bond of love and loyalty to nature (Bayland, 1995). Before tackling the principles, religious aspects, therapy, actions and education included in ecopsychology, it is essential to understand the reasons why humans need to change. Need for Change Because of the present industrial and technological age, most people already know humans are not living sustainablyRead MoreEssay on Sex Offender Treatment: A Literature Review2328 Words   |  10 Pagesbehavior. The body of research reveals different therapeutic treatment models and discusses the purpose and effectiveness of each model. This paper will also discuss some of the challenges of implementing therapeutic treatment schemas as viable alternatives to treat sex offenders. Lastly, the research will also examine the impact of treatment as it relates to recidivism. Sex Offender Treatment: A Literature Review The United States Bureau of Justice Statistics (2011) reveals an estimated

Ocean Acidification And Its Effect On The Oceans - 1727 Words

The mid to late twentieth century and the twenty first century have been devastating to the world’s oceans in terms of pollution, overfishing, ice caps melting, destruction of habitat, and increasing amounts carbon dioxide being dissolved into the water. These are only a few of the seemingly endless problems humans have introduced to the oceans. Things like the ice caps melting affect how basic aspects of the oceans function. Pollution and destruction of habitat affect nearly every species of marine organism. Fish die from toxic waste, turtles and sharks get caught in nets, and birds eat plastic. Overfishing depletes the population of certain species and throws entire food chains off balance. A combination of things affects fish and†¦show more content†¦With emissions from cars and deforestation at an all time high, so is the amount of carbon dioxide being dissolved into the world’s oceans. There are seemingly endless things people could be doing to help stop this, but don’t. This is because ocean acidification is one of the least advocated problems. Ocean acidification is one of the largest factors affecting today’s oceans and affects every ocean organism. The first organisms that ocean acidification affects are calcifying creatures. These include creatures like oysters, calcareous plankton, clams, sea urchins, and coral. The ocean normally has enough carbonate ions dissolved for calcifying creatures to use to create their shells. Ocean acidification negatively affects the ability for these organisms to build their shells. As carbon dioxide dissolves into the ocean it reacts with the water to form carbonic acid (What is Ocean, 2015). Also, as more carbon dioxide dissolves into the ocean, it reacts with seawater to make H+ ions. These H+ ions compete with calcifying creatures for the carbonate ions. The H+ ions often win making it much more difficult for these shelled creatures to make their shells (Cripps et al., 2014). C reatures like conch shells, oysters, and clams are the most negatively affected. But not all creatures are immediately affected. Some organisms such as crabs and lobsters and crabs actually grow heavier shells to combat the effects of changing pH. This adaptation

Organizational Competency for Management - myassignmenthelp.com

Question: Discuss about theOrganizational Competency for Finance and Management. Answer: The term organizational competency means the capability to job properly in an organization. It defines a set of behaviour that provides a structured guide that enables the identification, evaluation and development of the individual behaviour in each employees. In an organization when it creates a competitive advantages in the market place with its typical skills and activities it is termed as organizational competency(Tripathi Agrawal, 2014). The IKEA Company tries to improve the everyday life of the organization where the human resource manager clarifies the mission statement of improving the lifestyle in the organization. The company is targeting to create better life by lowering the price of the goods to attract more customers for their product. The human resource manager designs the strategy of the company for short term and long term objectives and design effective strategies to maintain it(Grlin Kostet, 2016). The role of the HR is very important here as he will determine the future of the company. The HRs design and steps will help the company to maintain its position in the market. The HR manager and the team is responsible for this and thus they should analyse the real result and evaluate them with the general strategies. The competency that the company is using has helped the company to reach a new height in the market. Hence, the HR should maintain the same standard of the company by implementing new and innov ative idea to carry on the company name in future days. Reference: Grlin, K., Kostet, M. (2016). Change Through Transformation: An exploratory case study on leadership in contrasting organisational contexts of IKEA Sweden. Tripathi, K., Agrawal, M. (2014). Competency based management in organizational.Global Journal of Finance and Management,6(4), 349-356.

C. Wright Mills- The Power Elite free essay sample

The powers of ordinary men are circumscribed by the everyday worlds in which they live, yet even in these rounds of job, family, and neighborhood they often seem driven by forces they can neither understand nor govern. Great changes are beyond their control, but affect their conduct and outlook none the less. The very framework of modern society confines them to projects not their own, but from every side, such changes now press upon the men and women of the mass society, who accordingly feel that they are without purpose in an epoch in which they are without power. But not all men are in this sense ordinary. As the means of information and of power are centralized, some men come to occupy positions in American society from which they can look down upon, so to speak, and by their decisions mightily affect, the everyday worlds of ordinary men and women. They are not made by their jobs; they set up and break down jobs for thousands of others; they are not confined by simple family responsibilities; they can escape. They may live in many hotels and houses, but they are bound by no one community. They need not merely meet the demands of the day and hour; in some part, they create these demands, and cause others to meet them. Whether or not they profess their power, their technical and political experience of it far transcends that of the underlying population. What Jacob Burckhardt said of great men, most Americans might well say of their elite: They are all that we are not. The power elite is composed of men whose positions enable them to transcend the ordinary environments of ordinary men and women; they are in positions to make decisions having major consequences. Whether they do or do not make such decisions is less important than the fact that they do occupy such pivotal positions: their failure to act, their failure to make decisions, is itself an act that is often of greater consequence than the decisions they do make. For they are in command of the major hierarchies and organizations of modern society. They rule the big corporations. They run the machinery of the state and claim its prerogatives. They direct the military establishment. They occupy the strategic command posts of the social structure, in which are now centered the effective means of the power and the wealth and the celebrity which they enjoy. The power elite are not solitary rulers. Advisers and consultants, spokesmen and opinion-makers are often the captains of their higher thought and decision. Immediately below the elite are the professional politicians of the middle levels of power, in the Congress and in the pressure groups, as well as among the new and old upper classes of town and city and region. Mingling with them, in curious ways which we shall explore, are those professional celebrities who live by being continually displayed but are never, so long as they remain celebrities, displayed enough If such celebrities are not at the head of any dominating hierarchy, they do often have the power to distract the attention of the public or afford sensations to the masses, or, more directly, to gain the ear of those who do occupy positions of direct power. More or less unattached, as critics of morality and technicians of power, as spokesmen of God and creators of mass sensibility, such celebrities and consultants are part of the immediate scene in which the drama of the elite is enacted. But that drama itself is centered in the command posts of the major institutional hierarchies. The truth about the nature and the power of the elite is not some secret which men of affairs know but will not tell. Such men hold quite various theories about their own roles in the sequence of event and decision. Often they are uncertain about their roles, and even more often they allow their fears and their hopes to affect their assessment of their own power. No matter how great their actual power, they tend to be less acutely aware of it than of the resistances of others to its use. Moreover, most American men of affairs have learned well the rhetoric of public relations, in some cases even to the point of using it when they are alone, and thus coming to believe it. The personal awareness of the actors is only one of the several sources one must examine in order to understand the higher circles. Yet many who believe that there is no elite, or at any rate none of any consequence, rest their argument upon what men of affairs believe about themselves, or at least assert in public. There is, however, another view: those who feel, even if vaguely, that a compact and powerful elite of great importance does now prevail in America often base that feeling upon the historical trend of our time. They have felt, for example, the domination of the military event, and from this they infer that generals and admirals, as well as other men of decision influenced by them, must be enormously powerful. They hear that the Congress has again abdicated to a handful of men decisions clearly related to the issue of war or peace. They know that the bomb was dropped over Japan in the name of the United States of America, although they were at no time consulted about the matter. They feel that they live in a time of big decisions; they know that they are not making any. Accordingly, as they consider the present as history, they infer that at its center, making decisions or failing to make them, there must be an elite of power. On the one hand, those who share this feeling about big historical events assume that there is an elite and that its power is great. On the other hand, those who listen carefully to the reports of men apparently involved in the great decisions often do not believe that there is an elite whose powers are of decisive consequence. Both views must be taken into account, but neither is adequate. The way to understand the power of the American elite lies neither solely in recognizing the historic scale of events nor in accepting the personal awareness reported by men of apparent decision. Behind such men and behind the events of history, linking the two, are the major institutions of modern society. These hierarchies of state and corporation and army constitute the means of power; as such they are now of a consequence not before equaled in human history-and at their summits, there are now those command posts of modern society which offer us the sociological key to an understanding of the role of the higher circles in America. Within American society, major national power now resides in the economic, the political, and the military domains. Other institutions seem off to the side of modern history, and, on occasion, duly subordinated to these. No family is as directly powerful in national affairs as any major corporation; no church is as directly powerful in the external biographies of young men in America today as the military establishment; no college is as powerful in the shaping of momentous events as the National Security Council. Religious, educational, and family institutions are not autonomous centers of national power; on the contrary, these decentralized areas are increasingly shaped by the big three, in which developments of decisive and immediate consequence now occur. Families and churches and schools adapt to modern life; governments and armies and corporations shape it; and, as they do so, they turn these lesser institutions into means for their ends. Religious institutions provide chaplains to the armed forces where they are used as a means of increasing the effectiveness of its morale to kill. Schools select and train men for their jobs in corporations and their specialized tasks in the armed forces. The extended family has, of course, long been broken up by the industrial revolution, and now the son and the father are removed from the family, by compulsion if need be, whenever the army of the state sends out the call. And the symbols of all these lesser institutions are used to legitimate the power and the decisions of the big three. The life-fate of the modern individual depends not only upon the family into which he was born or which he enters by marriage, but increasingly upon the corporation in which he spends the most alert hours of his best years; not only upon the school where he is educated as a child and adolescent, but also upon the state which touches him throughout his life; not only upon the church in which on occasion he hears the word of God, but also upon the army in which he is disciplined. If the centralized state could not rely upon the inculcation of nationalist loyalties in public and private schools, its leaders would promptly seek to modify the decentralized educational system, If the bankruptcy rate among the top five hundred corporations were as high as the general divorce rate among the thirty-seven million married couples, there would be economic catastrophe on an international scale. If members of armies gave to them no more of their lives than do believers to the churches to which they belong, there would be a military crisis. Within each of the big three, the typical institutional unit has become enlarged, has become administrative, and, in the power of its decisions, has become centralized. Behind these developments there is a fabulous technology, for as institutions, they have incorporated this technology and guide it, even as it shapes and paces their developments. The economy-once a great scatter of small productive units in autonomous balance-has become dominated by two or three hundred giant corporations, administratively and politically interrelated, which together hold the keys to economic decisions. The political order, once a decentralized set of several dozen states with a weak spinal cord, has become a centralized, executive establishment which has taken up into itself many powers previously scattered, and now enters into each and every crany of the social structure. The military order, once a slim establishment in a context of distrust fed by state militia, has become the largest and most expensive feature of government, and, although well versed in smiling public relations, now has all the grim and clumsy efficiency of a sprawling bureaucratic domain. In each of these institutional areas, the means of power at the disposal of decision makers have increased enormously; their central executive powers have been enhanced; within each of them modern administrative routines have been elaborated and tightened up. As each of these domains becomes enlarged and centralized, the consequences of its activities become greater, and its traffic with the others increases. The decisions of a handful of corporations bear upon military and political as well as upon economic developments around the world. The decisions of the military establishment rest upon and grievously affect political life as well as the very level of economic activity. The decisions made within the political domain determine economic activities and military programs. There is no longer, on the one hand, an economy, and, on the other hand, a political order containing a military establishment unimportant to politics and to money-making. There is a political economy linked, in a thousand ways, with military institutions and decisions. On each side of the world-split running through central Europe and around the Asiatic rimlands, there is an ever-increasing interlocking of economic, military, and political structures. If there is government intervention in the corporate economy, so is there corporate intervention in the governmental process. In the structural sense, this triangle of power is the source of the interlocking directorate that is most important for the historical structure of the present. The fact of the interlocking is clearly revealed at each of the points of crisis of modern capitalist society-slump, war, and boom. In each, men of decision are led to an awareness of the interdependence of the major institutional orders. In the nineteenth century, when the scale of all institutions was smaller, their liberal integration was achieved in the automatic economy, by an autonomous play of market forces, and in the automatic political domain, by the bargain and the vote. It was then assumed that out of the imbalance and friction that followed the limited decisions then possible a new equilibrium would in due course emerge. That can no longer be assumed, and it is not assumed by the men at the top of each of the three dominant hierarchies. For given the scope of their consequences, decisions-and indecisions-in any one of these ramify into the others, and hence top decisions tend either to become coordinated or to lead to a commanding indecision. It has not always been like this. When numerous small entrepreneurs made up the economy, for example, many of them could fail and the consequences still remain local; political and military authorities did not intervene. But now, given political expectations and military commitments, can they afford to allow key units of the private corporate economy to break down in slump? Increasingly, they do intervene in economic affairs, and as they do so, the controlling decisions in each order are inspected by agents of the other two, and economic, military, and political structures are interlocked. At the pinnacle of each of the three enlarged and centralized domains, there have arisen those higher circles which make up the economic, the political, and the military elites. At the top of the economy, among the corporate rich, there are the chief executives; at the top of the political order, the members of the political directorate; at the top of the military establishment, the elite of soldier-statesmen clustered in and around the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the upper echelon. As each of these domains has coincided with the others, as decisions tend to become total in their consequence, the leading men in each of the three domains of power-the warlords, the corporation chieftains, the political directorate-tend-to come together, to form the power elite of America. *** The Power Elite by C. Wright Mills Oxford Press, 1956 In the standard image of power and decision, no force is held to be as important as The Great American Public. More than merely another check and balance, this public is thought to be the seat of all legitimate power. In official life as in popular folklore, it is held to be the very balance wheel of democratic power. In the end, all liberal theorists rest their notions of the power system upon the political role of this public; all official decisions, as well as private decisions of consequence, are justified as in the publics welfare; all formal proclamations are in its name. Let us therefore consider the classic public of democratic theory in the generous spirit in which Rousseau once cried, Opinion, Queen of the World, is not subject to the power of kings; they are themselves its first slaves. The most important feature of the public of opinion, which the rise of the democratic middle class initiates, is the free ebb and flow of discussion. The possibilities of answering back, of organizing autonomous organs of public opinion, of realizing opinion in action, are held to be established by democratic institutions. The opinion that results from public discussion is understood to be a resolution that is then carried out by public action; it is, in one version, the general will of the people, which the legislative organ enacts into law, thus lending to it legal force. Congress, or Parliament, as an institution, crowns all the scattered publics; it is the archetype for each of the little circles of face-to-face citizens discussing their public business. This eighteenth-century idea of the public of public opinion parallels the economic idea of the market of the free economy. Here is the market composed of freely competing entrepreneurs; there is the public composed of discussion circles of opinion peers. As price is the result of anonymous, equally weighted, bargaining individuals, so public opinion is the result of each mans having thought things out for himself and contributing his voice to the great chorus. To be sure, some might have more influence on the state of opinion than others, but no one group monopolizes the discussion, or by itself determines the opinions that prevail. Innumerable discussion circles are knit together by mobile people who carry opinions from one to another, and struggle for the power of larger command. The public is thus organized into associations and parties, each representing a set of viewpoints, each trying to acquire a place in the Congress, where the discussion continues. Out of the little circles of people talking with one another, the larger forces of social movements and political parties develop; and the discussion of opinion is the important phase in a total act by which public affairs are conducted. The autonomy of these discussions is an important element in the idea of public opinion as a democratic legitimation. The opinions formed are actively realized within the prevailing institutions of power; all authoritative agents are made or broken by the prevailing opinions of these publics. And, in so far as the public is frustrated in realizing its demands, its members may go beyond criticism of specific policies; they may question the very legitimations of legal authority. That is one meaning of Jeffersons comment on the need for an occasional revolution. The public, so conceived, is the loom of classic, eighteenth-century democracy; discussion is at once the threads and the shuttle, tying the discussion circles together. It lies at the root of the conception of authority by discussion, and it is based upon the hope that truth and justice will somehow come out of society as a great apparatus of free discussion. The people are presented with problems. They discuss them. They decide on them. They formulate viewpoints. These viewpoints are organized, and they compete. One viewpoint wins out. Then the people act out this view, or their representatives are instructed to act it out, and this they promptly do. Such are the images of the public of classic democracy which are still used as the working justifications of power in American society. But now we must recognize this description as a set of images out of a fairy tale: they are not adequate even as an approximate model of how the American system of power works. The issues that now shape mans fate are neither raised nor decided by the public at large. The idea of the community of publics is not a description of fact, but an assertion of an ideal, an assertion of a legitimation masquerading-as legitimations are now apt to do-as fact. For now the public of public opinion is recognized by all those who have considered it carefully as something less than it once was. These doubts are asserted positively in the statement that the classic community of publics is being transformed into a society of masses. This transformation, in fact, is one of the keys to the social and psychological meaning of modern life in America. I. In the democratic society of publics it was assumed, with John Locke, that the individual conscience was the ultimate seat of judgment and hence the final court of appeal. But this principle was challenged-as E. H. Carr has put it-when Rousseau for the first time thought in terms of the sovereignty of the whole people, and faced the issue of mass democracy. II. In the democratic society of publics it was assumed that among the individuals who composed it there was a natural and peaceful harmony of interests. But this essentially conservative doctrine gave way to the Utilitarian doctrine that such a harmony of interests had first to be created by reform before it could work, and later to the Marxian doctrine of class struggle, which surely was then, and certainly is now, closer to reality than any assumed harmony of interests. III. In the democratic society of publics it was assumed that before public action would be taken, there would be rational discussion between individuals which would determine the action and that, accordingly, the public opinion that resulted would be the infallible voice of reason. But this has been challenged not only ( 1 ) by the assumed need for experts to decide delicate and intricate issues, but (2) by the discovery-as by Freud-of the irrationality of the man in the street, and (3) by the discovery- as by Marx-of the socially conditioned nature of what was once assumed to be autonomous reason. IV. In the democratic society of publics it was assumed that after determining what is true and right and just, the public would act accordingly or see that its representatives did so. In the long run, public opinion will not only be right, but public opinion will prevail. This assumption has been upset by the great gap now existing between the underlying population and those who make decisions in its name, decisions of enormous consequence which the public often does not even know are being made until well after the fact. *** Public opinion exists when people who are not in the government of a country claim the right to express political opinions freely and publicly, and the right that these opinions should influence or determine the policies, personnel, and actions of their government. In this formal sense there has been and there is a definite public opinion in the United States. And yet, with modern developments this formal right-when it does still exist as a right -does not mean what it once did. The older world of voluntary organization was as different from the world of the mass organization, as was Tom Paines world of pamphleteering from the world of the mass media. Since the French Revolution, conservative thinkers have Viewed With Alarm the rise of the public, which they called the masses, or something to that effect. The populace is sovereign, and the tide of barbarism mounts, wrote Gustave Le Bon. The divine right of the masses is about to replace the divine right of kings, and already the destinies of nations are elaborated at present in the heart of the masses, and no longer in the councils of princes. During the twentieth century, liberal and even socialist thinkers have followed suit, with more explicit reference to what we have called the society of masses. From Le Bon to Emil Lederer and Ortega y Gasset, they have held that the influence of the mass in unfortunately increasing. But surely those who have supposed the masses to be all powerful, or at least well on their way to triumph, are wrong. In our time, as Chakhofin knew, the influence of autonomous collectivities within political life is in fact diminishing. Furthermore, such influence as they do have is guided; they must now be seen not as publics acting autonomously, but as masses manipulated at focal points into crowds of demonstrators. For as publics become masses, masses sometimes become crowds; and, in crowds, the psychical rape by the mass media is supplemented up-close by the harsh and sudden harangue. Then the people in the crowd disperse again-as atomized and submissive masses. In all modern societies, the autonomous associations standing between the various classes and the state tend to lose their effect as vehicles of reasoned opinion and instruments for the rational exertion of political will. Such associations can be deliberately broken up and thus turned into passive instruments of rule, or they can more slowly wither away from lack of use in the face of centralized means of power. But whether they are destroyed in a week or wither in a generation, such associations are replaced in virtually every sphere of life by centralized organizations, and it is such organizations with all their new means of power that take charge of the terrorized or-as the case may be-merely intimidated, society of masses. The institutional trends that make for a society of masses are to a considerable extent a matter of impersonal drift, but the remnants of the public are also exposed to more personal and intentional forces. With the broadening of the base of politics within the context of a folk-lore of democratic decision-making, and with the increased means of mass persuasion that are available, the public of public opinion has become the object of intensive efforts to control, manage, manipulate, and increasingly intimidate. In political, military, economic realms, power becomes, in varying degrees, uneasy before the suspected opinions of masses, and, accordingly, opinion-making becomes an accepted technique of power-holding and power-getting. The minority electorate of the propertied and the educated is replaced by the total suffrage-and intensive campaigns for the vote. The small eighteenth-century professional army is replaced by the mass army of conscripts-and by the problems of nationalist morale. The small shop is replaced by the mass-production industry-and the national advertisement. As the scale of institutions has become larger and more centralized, so has the range and intensity of the opinion-makers efforts. The means of opinion-making, in fact, have paralleled in range and efficiency the other institutions of greater scale that cradle the modern society of masses. Accordingly, in addition to their enlarged and centralized means of administration, exploitation, and violence, the modern elite have had placed within their grasp historically unique instruments of psychic management and manipulation, which include universal compulsory education as well as the media of mass communication. Early observers believed that the increase in the range and volume of the formal means of communication would enlarge and animate the primary public. In such optimistic views-written before radio and television and movies-the formal media are understood as simply multiplying the scope and pace of personal discussion. Modern conditions, Charles Cooley wrote, enlarge indefinitely the competition of ideas, and whatever has owed its persistence merely to lack of comparison is likely to go, for that which is really congenial to the choosing mind will be all the more cherished and increased. Still excited by the break-up of the conventional consensus of the local community, he saw the new means of communication as furthering the conversational dynamic of classic democracy, and with it the growth of rational and free individuality. No one really knows all the functions of the mass media, for in their entirety these functions are probably so pervasive and so subtle that they cannot be caught by the means of social research now available. But we do now have reason to believe that these media have helped less to enlarge and animate the discussions of primary publics than to transform them into a set of media markets in mass-like society. *** In their attempts to neutralize or to turn to their own use the articulate public, the opinion-makers try to make it a relay network for their views. If the opinion-makers have so much power that they can act directly and openly upon the primary publics, they may become authoritative; but, if they do not have such power and hence have to operate indirectly and without visibility, they will assume the stance of manipulators. Authority is power that is explicit and more or less voluntarily obeyed; manipulation is the secret exercise of power, unknown to those who are influenced. In the model of the classic democratic society, manipulation is not a problem, because formal authority resides in the public itself and in its representatives who are made or broken by the public. In the completely authoritarian society, manipulation is not a problem, because authority is openly identified with the ruling institutions and their agents, who may use authority explicitly and nakedly. They do not, in the extreme case, have to gain or retain power by hiding its exercise. Manipulation becomes a problem wherever men have power that is concentrated and willful but do not have authority, or when, for any reason, they do not wish to use their power openly. Then the powerful seek to rule without showing their powerfulness. They want to rule, as it were, secretly, without publicized legitimation. It is in this mixed case-as in the intermediate reality of the American today-that manipulation is a prime way of exercising power. Small circles of men are making decisions which they need to have at least authorized by indifferent or recalcitrant people over whom they do not exercise explicit authority. So the small circle tries to manipulate these people into willing acceptance or cheerful support of their decisions or opinions-or at least to the rejection of possible counter-opinions. Authority formally resides in the people, but power is in fact held by small circles of men. That is why the standard strategy of manipulation is to make it appear that the people, or at least a large group of them, really made the decision. That is why even when the authority is available, men with access to it may still prefer the secret, quieter ways of manipulation. But are not the people now more educated? Why not emphasize the spread of education rather than the increased effects of the mass media? The answer, in brief, is that mass education, in many respects, has become-another mass medium. The prime task of public education, as it came widely to be understood in this country, was political: to make the citizen more knowledgeable and thus better able to think and to judge of public affairs. In time, the function of education shifted from the political to the economic: to train people for better-paying jobs and thus to get ahead. This is especially true of the high-school movement, which has met the business demands for white-collar skills at the publics expense. In large part education has become merely vocational; in so far as its political task is concerned, in many schools, that has been reduced to a routine training of nationalist loyalties. The training of skills that are of more or less direct use in the vocational life is an important task to perform, but ought not to be mistaken for liberal education: job advancement, no matter on what levels, is not the same as self-development, although the two are now systematically confused. Among skills, some are more and some are less relevant to the aims of liberal-that is to say, ]liberating-education. Skills and values cannot be so easily separated as the academic search for supposedly neutral skills causes us to assume. And especially not when we speak seriously of liberal education. Of course, there is a scale, with skills at one end and values at the other, but it is the middle range of this scale, which one might call sensibilities, that are of most relevance to the classic public. To train someone to operate a lathe or to read and write is pretty much education of skill; to evoke from people an understanding of what they really want out of their lives or to debate with them stoic, Christian and humanist ways of living, is pretty much a clear-cut education of values. But to assist in the birth among a group of people of those cultural and political and technical sensibilities which would make them genuine members of a genuinely liberal public, this is at once a training in skills and an education of values. It includes a sort of therapy in the ancient sense of clarifying ones knowledge of ones self; it includes the imparting of all those skills of controversy with ones self, which we call thinking; and with others, which we call debate. And the end product of such liberal education of sensibilities is simply the self-educating, self-cultivating man or woman. The knowledgeable man in the genuine public is able to turn his personal troubles into social issues, to see their relevance for his community and his communitys relevance for them. He understands that what he thinks and feels as personal troubles are very often not only that but problems shared by others and indeed not subject to solution by any one individual but only by modifications of the structure of the groups in which he lives and sometimes the structure of the entire society. Men in masses are gripped by personal troubles, but they are not aware of their true meaning and source. Men in public confront issues, and they are aware of their terms. It is the task of the liberal institution, as of the liberally educated man, continually to translate troubles into issues and issues into the terms of their human meaning for the individual. In the absence of deep and wide